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A Comment on McCaleb's "'The 
Size Principle and Collective- 
Consumption Payoffs to 
Political Coalitions" 
R I C H A R D  J. S T O L L  
Thomas McCaleb's article in the Spring 1974 PUBLIC CHOICE presents a 
comment on William Riker's size principle. He claims that  it is an inappropriate 
model for analyzing public goods payoffs under certain conditions. While this is 
true, it is not true for the reasons he claims. 
McCaleb argues that 
Implicit in this [Riker's] analysis is the assumption that the payoff  to 
a coalition is perfectly divisable among the members- tha t  is, that the 
payoff  possesses the characteristics of  the economist's private good. 
(McCaleb, p. 108) 
He goes on to show that this implicit assumption is required by constructing an 
example where the payoff  is a public good. That is, the characteristic function is 
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V(S)=ai=. . . . . .  =a., i, jES 
where S is the coa~tion, 
V(S) is the payoff to the coalition and a i . . . .  aj are the payoffs to the 
individual members of the coalition. 
If this characteristic function has a slope of 0 as the membership changes, and 
a coalition of larger than minimal winning size is formed, there is no incentive to 
expel members until minimal winning size is reached. 
Given McCahb's assumptions, his argument holds true, although one wonders 
how often a public goods payoff could be restricted to just the winning side. But 
using his assumptions, he violates one of Riker's. Such a characteristic function is 
explicitly excluded by one of Piker's assumptions. This is the conidition of 
superadditivity which can be stated as 
V(St3T) v(S) + v(T),SfN T = 
where S, T CN, the set of players 
and v(X) is te payoff to X C N. 
Thus, the condition requires that the payoffs to an individaul or coalition be 
pure private goods. So McCaleb's contention that there i s an implicit assumption is 
wrong. However, i t  is interesting to speculate on how one would analyze public 
goods payoffs with a game theoretic format. It would seem that some 
reformulation of the assumptions would be necessary to allow this to be done. 
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